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Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future

09.11.2026 ·40 min 24 s · 7 rozdziałów

Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future

0:17 · Wprowadzenie i temat 1

Cześć wszystkim, witam w kolejnym podcastie Strategy Future. Dziś mamy coś niesamowitego, ponieważ Jacek, mój zwyczajny kołożnik i fundator Strategy Future, nie mógł to zrobić. Czekałem na niego, a potem on mi powiedział, że jest na drodze do spotkania, więc tutaj jestem sam, próbując coś zrobić. Myślałem, że może dobrym zdaniem byłoby, żeby porozmawiać trochę o tym problemie, bardzo blisko mojego serca w ogóle, And very pressing in particular when it comes to recent events, namely strategic stability in the context of Russia, NATO and Russia-US relations.

2:43 · Polecamia i analiza artykułu w Wall Street Journal 4

Regarding future conflict with Russia. And one of the recommendations was again to develop long-range fires capability by NATO that would be capable of hitting Russia. And the article tries to describe it as denial, as trying to hit the archer rather than the arrow. But to be perfectly honest, I'm a little skeptical if that framing is correct. I think US campaign in Iran has proven conclusively that hitting the archer might be very, very difficult. Hitting both the archer and the arrow really at this point in time is extremely difficult because if you're trying to hit the arrow, you're expanding.

Very expensive and very tough to replace munitions such as missiles for the Patriot system. I think everybody interested in the topic has at least heard of the US manufacturing base issues with producing those missiles. CSIS report, I believe, covered it extensively. So, shortly speaking, hitting the Archer appears to be both very difficult and economically not viable. And even if it was economically viable, which it isn't, those effectors are often more expensive than the missiles launched. But even if money was no object, then it still wouldn't be feasible simply because there are bottlenecks in missile production.

So this is not the option. Ukraine has proven it again. War in Iran, with Iran, US war against Iran has also proven it. Even Israel, not to mention the US, were unable to fully mop up Iranian missile strikes and drone strikes. So hitting the archer is not the option. Hitting the arrow is not the option. While US can failed campaign to destroy Iran's capability to launch those missiles has also proven largely ineffective. Tak więc, przejście archerów nie jest opcją tutaj. Nie jestem pewien, czy ujęcie użytego przez autorów tego artykułu, że to jest próba odnalezienia, jest naprawdę nieaktywna.

This has been raised by the Russians for great many years, I suppose theoretically for good reasons, looking at how The US has been able to hit command and control nodes during, for example, the first war in the Gulf, the first Gulf War. So those aren't fully unjustified, although I suppose the degree to which Russians have achieved redundancy and also the sheer number and scale of different weapons platforms, delivery vehicles that Russians have for their nuclear weapons Both strategic and non-strategic really means that such an attempt by either US or the entire NATO, should they even possess those weapons in sufficient numbers, would be insane and that's just on a technical level rather than political cost-benefit and risk analysis, which also renders this idea very unlikely, which again doesn't mean the Russians could just shrug.

13:50 · Krytyka propozycji rozwijania długodystansowych rakiet 5

Ale potem Gavin stwierdzi, czy zapyta, czy to akurat refleksuje sposób, w jaki działa świat. It is interesting to reflect on how rarely the ups and downs of the superpower geopolitical competition mirrored the movements of the arms race. The Soviets pushed the United States aggressively on the issue of West Germany's military status by threatening West Berlin viability at a time when the USSR was not only weak but potentially open to a US first strike in the late 50s. The Soviets left the West Berlin alone in 1962, even as the US nuclear superiority that arguably helped protect the city disappeared.

And I think this is very true. I don't think, also basically because without being able to address the fundamental issues, There won't be enough trust between parties to really engage in those things. Or even if attempts are made, they will either peter out or they will be mere feints from either side trying to Gain an upper hand from the other party. And I think a great example of this, a very recent great example of this, budding one, it's perhaps too early to call it that, but I think so, is the status of relationship between the US and China.

But it couldn't be achieved. There wasn't really much platform, much opportunity for the two sides to communicate in good will. And this is at least partly due to how the Americans managed the relationship with China and with Taiwan. Which was, by the way, under Biden administration, unfortunately for those of us, Poles included, who want to see US primacy continue, was catastrophic. And this isn't just me giving this assessment. I remember Jake Sullivan, Jake Sullivan. Myślę, że to było kiedyś w zeszłym roku, kiedy zaprezentował podkast, albo jakąś nową platformę, nową ideę dla niego, żeby zrobić coś, po tym, co zrobił w rządzie USA.

Powiedział, że wyjście Nancy Pelosi do Tajwanu I one could say that she was a speaker of the house. And she had no impact, or US presidential administration, White House had no impact on how she conducts her business. But I don't think it's really true. It was obviously a democratic presidency.

She was a democrat. And even if that's true, then Biden's Repeat statements, which again were usually walked back by the White House, that the US would defend Taiwan actively, really served to drive home the point for the Chinese That the US might be thinking actively engaging in potential Taiwan contingency directly. So the underlying, I suppose the underlying fundamental issue was the status of Taiwan. Everything, even looking at how the Chinese are willing to cooperate with the US. Today one can see that once Trump maybe did not change the overall strategic ambiguity position of the US, but kind of brought up the other side of the equation while Biden administration underscored that the US would be likely willing to get involved in the war.

20:28 · Historia i teoria strategicznej stabilności 8

Trump is underscoring that it's likely that the US will not be willing to get involved in Taiwan. I to było tylko wtedy, tylko kiedy, może nie był to substancjalnie stworzony zmiany relacji Amerykańskiej z Tajemnikiem, ale raczej to zmniejszenie polityki, deklaracyjnej polityki Stanów Zjednoczonych. That the possibility for more amicable relationship with China was created. And now, as far as I can tell, at least according to the media, there are more constructive military-to-military confidence-building measures being employed. And it was only after, only after a underlying political issue was, if not addressed, then at least redressed to look better, that it became possible.

Before that, no amount of pleading or asking or even establishing, if it was even possible, strategic stability measures would produce that outcome. I znowu, to samo jak w Wrocławiu. Kiedy sytuacja na ziemiach zmienia się, to rzeczy jak systemy broni i takie rzeczy zaczynają znaleźć znaczenie. Przedtem tego naprawdę nie było. I to oczywiście powoduje mnie do problemu najbliższego do mojego serca, czyli sytuacji, w której Polska znajduje się jako członkowie NATO. The basic thing I must point out is that while for a very good reason US considers improving strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia a desirable goal, it really isn't desirable for Poland.

Because usually, again, strategic stability can be most easily achieved once certain arguments of the side that is threatening the strategic stability are taken into the account. And certain political facts are recognized and, to put it in simple terms, the US backs down. Na przykład w polskim kontekście jest bardzo jasne, że przystąpienie do ustawy o stworzeniu NATO-Rusia w 1997 roku, w mojej uwierze, jest ulepszeniem strategicznej stabilności. Nie wypożyczając NATO-trubów na permanentnym poziomie do Polski i innych krajów, które połączyły się z NATO w latach 90.

Makes perfect sense from the strategic stability viewpoint. Similarly, it makes perfect sense and is beneficial for strategic stability not to have Poland be a part of the NATO nuclear sharing. This is all true. No doubt about this. For the US and for Russia, this improves strategic stability, it allows for Basically a more stable relationship removes uncertainties, some uncertainties from planning, from the overall relation between the states. But unfortunately this happens, so that improves. The overall security of the United States, but simultaneously at the very same time that strategic stability decreases overall safety of Poland.

For example, the decision not to deploy or not to include Poland As a country involved in nuclear sharing, as a country where nuclear weapons, US nuclear weapons that would be, should general war occur, be employed by NATO, according to NATO nuclear planning group plans. Not to have those weapons in Poland does increase strategic stability, but if the situation would be reversed, one could argue, it isn't certain at all, but one could argue that this would improve Poland's security, namely by raising the costs and introducing an element of precise instability and uncertainty and potential for escalation.

Should Russians decide to engage in warfare against Poland, they might consider those places of storage of nuclear weapons as a viable or necessary target to strike and that could yield Unpredictable escalation patterns. By not placing those weapons, US security increases, but at the same time ours decreases and vice versa. If we're able to have those weapons on our territory, our security would increase, but at the same time at the cost of decreasing US safety, by decreasing the margin of error that the US has ability to decide whether they are willing and able to engage And it's very much the same with permanent stationing of forces.

This is, again, a similar situation to West Berlin, where Berlin Brigade, staffed by US soldiers, with families, with children, kids, living in West Berlin, were the integral element of the US deterrence. Not because the Berlin Brigade could defeat or hold West Berlin, Obviously ten to fifteen thousand soldiers facing hundreds of thousands of DDR troops and Soviet troops and the entire might of the Warsaw Pact. So the role of those soldiers was not to fight and win, but the role of the soldiers was obviously to die, this is fairly obvious, alongside their families.

Raising the stakes for the United States And also doing what Thomas Schelling called burning the bridges. The way Schelling put it is by placing soldiers in places where then the onus of action is not really on the US and decision to get involved in war, but rather on the side who would initiate the hostilities, the Soviet Union, the US, and placing them in the way of the Soviet advance in places where on the very first day of the conflict they would be exposed. So that was by definition.

27:52 · Przykład relacji USA i Chin 3

That's the The point of tripwire. Now, some scholars, for example, I think Emma Ashworth pointed out that even if tripwire forces were placed in key places where, you know, like the West Berlin today, Suwalki Gap, Eastern Poland border, Narva in Estonia, even if those troops were placed there, it would still not mean and should still not be treated By default as a guarantee that the US would get involved and would be willing, for example, to fight a nuclear war, and that's a very good point, but it does make the situation more unpredictable.

Again, as Schilling pointed out, the idea that someone decides to initiate nuclear war in defense of an ally in any other contingency than immediate acute existential threat to their own survival has the problem of incredibility. One has to suspend this belief, to fully believe it, but it is about making this not fully impossible, manipulating the risk of Uncontrollable escalation, as I believe Jason Castillo, professor at Texas A&M puts it. So again, in and of itself, the proof of the pudding would be in the pudding. If the US would be willing to place the soldiers there, in and of itself, it would obviously help to deter the Russians, because the Americans would be willingly accepting the possibility that they might be involved in that war from day one.

And they would effectively be placing the owners of the decision making on the other side. One could argue that even during the Cold War, the idea that the US would fight a nuclear war in defense of Western Europeans was a controversial and uncertain one. At the end of the day, the US still had nuclear weapons of their own and the entire Atlantic Ocean separating them from the Soviets. But back then, obviously, the amalgamation of the Soviet military potential and demographic potential and raw resources with the Western European Monetary resources and technological prowess could create a regional hegemon and the regional hegemon could directly threaten the United States.

32:20 · Strategia Polski wobec Rosji 2

W tej chwili, ta wspólnota zrozumienia, ta wspólna denominacja nie może być dotarła. Ultimately cannot be reached. The Soviets or the Russians might pose an existential threat to Poland, but they will not be an existential threat to anybody west of the river Oder, or perhaps even to the west of the river Vistula, which divides Poland into two. But that means any war with Russia would naturally be a limited affair with limited objectives and limited wars must be solved by political means rather than an existential war that it is for Poland. And that in turn means that Poland could try and hedge to secure actions by the US that would improve its security situation.

Thank you and I hope next week we'll meet again with Jacek, not just me soloing the entire episode. Take care. And I wouldn't mind if you subscribe to Strategy and Future as well, it would really help us a lot. Take care.

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