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Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future

09.11.2026 ·40 min 24 s · 7 rozdziałów

Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future

0:17 · Wprowadzenie i temat 1

I mostly based my book on other than the classics like Schelling or Kahn and then, you know, George Bundy. I other classics like this. I also used extensively a book by Vipin Narang. Two books by Vipin Narang. One related to strategies of proliferation and the other to nuclear strategies of middle powers. And finally a book and writings on which I relied greatly when writing those books and trying to understand the topic was a book by Francis Gavin. Who is the editor of the Texas National Security Review. And he wrote a great deal on the topic of strategic stability.

8:56 · Strategiczna stabilność i jej znaczenie 2

Those things are all very nice, fine and dandy, but I argue, you know, sort of, I didn't really come up with this on my own. This has been an argument raised by, for example, Colin Gray, but also more recently by people like Francis Gavin, which I have mentioned in his I w jego książce, ciągle zapominam o nazwie, ale nazwa jego książki, znowu fantastyczna, była Nuclear Statecraft. To książka, którą czytałem mnóstwo razy, kiedy pisałem swoją. I tam Gavin argumentuje, tak jak Gray, że strategiczna stabilność nie jest czymś, co budujesz,

From piecemeal or granular perspective of confidence building measures or ping pong matches or arms limitation treaties or anything like this. All those things, the fact that those could even be achieved that representatives of two states that have opposing interests could meet And discuss those things, those measures in good will, let alone implement them, let alone put them in writing in a treaty, is really always downstream of political issues. Gavin makes a great point when he describes different theories of nuclear deterrence that were being developed in the early nuclear age, in the 50s and 60s.

13:50 · Krytyka propozycji rozwijania długodystansowych rakiet 2

Ale potem Gavin stwierdzi, czy zapyta, czy to akurat refleksuje sposób, w jaki działa świat. It is interesting to reflect on how rarely the ups and downs of the superpower geopolitical competition mirrored the movements of the arms race. The Soviets pushed the United States aggressively on the issue of West Germany's military status by threatening West Berlin viability at a time when the USSR was not only weak but potentially open to a US first strike in the late 50s. The Soviets left the West Berlin alone in 1962, even as the US nuclear superiority that arguably helped protect the city disappeared.

And I think this is very true. I don't think, also basically because without being able to address the fundamental issues, There won't be enough trust between parties to really engage in those things. Or even if attempts are made, they will either peter out or they will be mere feints from either side trying to Gain an upper hand from the other party. And I think a great example of this, a very recent great example of this, budding one, it's perhaps too early to call it that, but I think so, is the status of relationship between the US and China.

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