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Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future

09.11.2026 ·40 min 24 s · 7 rozdziałów

Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future

2:43 · Polecamia i analiza artykułu w Wall Street Journal 1

And strategic stability and measures how to improve it, how to manage the relationship with Russia are also front and center of the, or will be front and center in the upcoming meeting, I suppose, between Russia, again Ukraine, and the United States and Abu Dhabi. And that topic is interesting. And very close to my heart, because it directly impacts Poland, of course. So there are quite a few ideas being floated around as to how to achieve said strategic stability in the triangle between NATO and NATO states, including those on the eastern flank. And the United States and Russia.

20:28 · Historia i teoria strategicznej stabilności 4

Before that, no amount of pleading or asking or even establishing, if it was even possible, strategic stability measures would produce that outcome. I znowu, to samo jak w Wrocławiu. Kiedy sytuacja na ziemiach zmienia się, to rzeczy jak systemy broni i takie rzeczy zaczynają znaleźć znaczenie. Przedtem tego naprawdę nie było. I to oczywiście powoduje mnie do problemu najbliższego do mojego serca, czyli sytuacji, w której Polska znajduje się jako członkowie NATO. The basic thing I must point out is that while for a very good reason US considers improving strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia a desirable goal, it really isn't desirable for Poland.

Makes perfect sense from the strategic stability viewpoint. Similarly, it makes perfect sense and is beneficial for strategic stability not to have Poland be a part of the NATO nuclear sharing. This is all true. No doubt about this. For the US and for Russia, this improves strategic stability, it allows for Basically a more stable relationship removes uncertainties, some uncertainties from planning, from the overall relation between the states. But unfortunately this happens, so that improves. The overall security of the United States, but simultaneously at the very same time that strategic stability decreases overall safety of Poland.

For example, the decision not to deploy or not to include Poland As a country involved in nuclear sharing, as a country where nuclear weapons, US nuclear weapons that would be, should general war occur, be employed by NATO, according to NATO nuclear planning group plans. Not to have those weapons in Poland does increase strategic stability, but if the situation would be reversed, one could argue, it isn't certain at all, but one could argue that this would improve Poland's security, namely by raising the costs and introducing an element of precise instability and uncertainty and potential for escalation.

Should Russians decide to engage in warfare against Poland, they might consider those places of storage of nuclear weapons as a viable or necessary target to strike and that could yield Unpredictable escalation patterns. By not placing those weapons, US security increases, but at the same time ours decreases and vice versa. If we're able to have those weapons on our territory, our security would increase, but at the same time at the cost of decreasing US safety, by decreasing the margin of error that the US has ability to decide whether they are willing and able to engage And it's very much the same with permanent stationing of forces.

27:52 · Przykład relacji USA i Chin 1

That's the The point of tripwire. Now, some scholars, for example, I think Emma Ashworth pointed out that even if tripwire forces were placed in key places where, you know, like the West Berlin today, Suwalki Gap, Eastern Poland border, Narva in Estonia, even if those troops were placed there, it would still not mean and should still not be treated By default as a guarantee that the US would get involved and would be willing, for example, to fight a nuclear war, and that's a very good point, but it does make the situation more unpredictable.

32:20 · Strategia Polski wobec Rosji 4

Even if that means weakening deterrence. And I don't think that circle can be squared, that you can improve strategic stability overall for Poland, for example, and not negatively affect strategic stability. But that effectively means that that situation might not be resolved because the political things necessary to achieve strategic stability are the things that Poland considers as anathema to its strategic objectives and interests. And that circle also cannot be squared. And under those circumstances, I think once Polish elites realize this, and I'm not sure if they do right now, but sooner or later, either the current elites will or the ones that replace them will, The situation cannot continue.

W tej chwili, ta wspólnota zrozumienia, ta wspólna denominacja nie może być dotarła. Ultimately cannot be reached. The Soviets or the Russians might pose an existential threat to Poland, but they will not be an existential threat to anybody west of the river Oder, or perhaps even to the west of the river Vistula, which divides Poland into two. But that means any war with Russia would naturally be a limited affair with limited objectives and limited wars must be solved by political means rather than an existential war that it is for Poland. And that in turn means that Poland could try and hedge to secure actions by the US that would improve its security situation.

But I don't think it will get them. I think ultimately Poland will have to contend with the reality that middle powers threatened by greater powers always face that they have a closed menu of options. And this is not basing their security and survival on the assumption that collective security treaties will work and rather either base it on a regional alliances among states that share the threat perspective Emanating from the same country, so in our case it would be places like Nordic countries, Sweden, Finland. The Baltic states, if we're willing to engage in war with Russia for the Baltics, are very hardly defensible. Places like Ukraine, Romania, perhaps Turkey, but one has to remember that such alliance, like any alliances, would have to operate under the most common denominator.

To, to, to dishing out punishment to the other state was defeating its armed forces. Well nuclear weapons made it redundant, made it possible to deliver a great amount of pain and terror for political reasons to your, to your enemy without the precondition of defeating their armed forces. And I think Poland ultimately cannot really base The state strategy and survival strategy on the assumption that a concept like NATO will suffice to defend it and it will have to choose from this closed a la carte menu of four options. So it will either have to find regional alliances, declare neutrality and hope that's enough, decide how and under what conditions it's willing to accommodate Russia or nuclearize.

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