Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future
Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future
Cześć wszystkim, witam w kolejnym podcastie Strategy Future. Dziś mamy coś niesamowitego, ponieważ Jacek, mój zwyczajny kołożnik i fundator Strategy Future, nie mógł to zrobić. Czekałem na niego, a potem on mi powiedział, że jest na drodze do spotkania, więc tutaj jestem sam, próbując coś zrobić. Myślałem, że może dobrym zdaniem byłoby, żeby porozmawiać trochę o tym problemie, bardzo blisko mojego serca w ogóle, And very pressing in particular when it comes to recent events, namely strategic stability in the context of Russia, NATO and Russia-US relations.
And strategic stability and measures how to improve it, how to manage the relationship with Russia are also front and center of the, or will be front and center in the upcoming meeting, I suppose, between Russia, again Ukraine, and the United States and Abu Dhabi. And that topic is interesting. And very close to my heart, because it directly impacts Poland, of course. So there are quite a few ideas being floated around as to how to achieve said strategic stability in the triangle between NATO and NATO states, including those on the eastern flank. And the United States and Russia.
Regarding future conflict with Russia. And one of the recommendations was again to develop long-range fires capability by NATO that would be capable of hitting Russia. And the article tries to describe it as denial, as trying to hit the archer rather than the arrow. But to be perfectly honest, I'm a little skeptical if that framing is correct. I think US campaign in Iran has proven conclusively that hitting the archer might be very, very difficult. Hitting both the archer and the arrow really at this point in time is extremely difficult because if you're trying to hit the arrow, you're expanding.
Myślę, że to jest znacznie bardziej podobne do wypowiedzi o zniszczeniu. The ability to respond to Russian strikes against, for example, infrastructure or key transport nodes or power generation facilities or ports and so on and so forth. You know, the necessity to come up with an ability to also impose costs on Russians, to change their calculus and, you know, bring the pain, be able to deliver the pain very quickly to Russia itself, but that's really punishment. So, you know, Irrespective of whether it is deterrence by punishment or by denial, I've also noted that quite a few voices in the strategic community, in the analytical community, were very critical of the idea, saying that those deployments would even further negatively affect
Strategic stability or what remains thereof between Russia and the United States and NATO more broadly. And you know, among a myriad of reasons why it would be the case, because I'm not, even though I'm Polish and we're not really very predisposed to those kind of arguments, I of course recognize the merit in them. The chief reason among many is that it would again very much underscore Russian fears of I guess what could be called conventional splendid first strike, namely the ability to target Russian communication, command and control nodes, At a scale with conventional weapons, thus rendering Russia unable to deliver a first strike or to employ nuclear weapons, which I believe has been a very long-running concern among the Russian strategic analysis community, so to speak.
This has been raised by the Russians for great many years, I suppose theoretically for good reasons, looking at how The US has been able to hit command and control nodes during, for example, the first war in the Gulf, the first Gulf War. So those aren't fully unjustified, although I suppose the degree to which Russians have achieved redundancy and also the sheer number and scale of different weapons platforms, delivery vehicles that Russians have for their nuclear weapons Both strategic and non-strategic really means that such an attempt by either US or the entire NATO, should they even possess those weapons in sufficient numbers, would be insane and that's just on a technical level rather than political cost-benefit and risk analysis, which also renders this idea very unlikely, which again doesn't mean the Russians could just shrug.
Those of you listeners who have followed the trajectory of the Sino-American relationship under Biden will note that one of the core talking points or core demands or requests that the American side made to the Chinese was to increase military to military contacts, different working groups between members of the military establishment of both countries. And China has been very consistent in refusal They are still very consistent in refusal to engage in arms limitations or like a new start replacement that the Americans want to include China, not just Russia.
Before that, no amount of pleading or asking or even establishing, if it was even possible, strategic stability measures would produce that outcome. I znowu, to samo jak w Wrocławiu. Kiedy sytuacja na ziemiach zmienia się, to rzeczy jak systemy broni i takie rzeczy zaczynają znaleźć znaczenie. Przedtem tego naprawdę nie było. I to oczywiście powoduje mnie do problemu najbliższego do mojego serca, czyli sytuacji, w której Polska znajduje się jako członkowie NATO. The basic thing I must point out is that while for a very good reason US considers improving strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia a desirable goal, it really isn't desirable for Poland.
Makes perfect sense from the strategic stability viewpoint. Similarly, it makes perfect sense and is beneficial for strategic stability not to have Poland be a part of the NATO nuclear sharing. This is all true. No doubt about this. For the US and for Russia, this improves strategic stability, it allows for Basically a more stable relationship removes uncertainties, some uncertainties from planning, from the overall relation between the states. But unfortunately this happens, so that improves. The overall security of the United States, but simultaneously at the very same time that strategic stability decreases overall safety of Poland.
Should Russians decide to engage in warfare against Poland, they might consider those places of storage of nuclear weapons as a viable or necessary target to strike and that could yield Unpredictable escalation patterns. By not placing those weapons, US security increases, but at the same time ours decreases and vice versa. If we're able to have those weapons on our territory, our security would increase, but at the same time at the cost of decreasing US safety, by decreasing the margin of error that the US has ability to decide whether they are willing and able to engage And it's very much the same with permanent stationing of forces.
Again, as Schilling pointed out, the idea that someone decides to initiate nuclear war in defense of an ally in any other contingency than immediate acute existential threat to their own survival has the problem of incredibility. One has to suspend this belief, to fully believe it, but it is about making this not fully impossible, manipulating the risk of Uncontrollable escalation, as I believe Jason Castillo, professor at Texas A&M puts it. So again, in and of itself, the proof of the pudding would be in the pudding. If the US would be willing to place the soldiers there, in and of itself, it would obviously help to deter the Russians, because the Americans would be willingly accepting the possibility that they might be involved in that war from day one.
And now I'm afraid and I think it's completely obvious. It's just one of the obvious things that aren't really mentioned publicly because it's never good to be the boy who says that the emperor has no clothes. That situation no longer applies. Russia clearly cannot ...gun for regional hegemony. It's nowhere near. So far it has failed to secure its own sphere of influence in Ukraine, let alone try to repeat Operation Bagration and then occupy Berlin or march on the Champs-Élysées or show up in Piccadilly. That's not going to happen. Russia cannot recreate Even attempt to recreate regional hegemony.
It's nowhere close and there is no realistic scenario when that could happen. But that essentially means that the very raison d'être of NATO is really questionable and the basic operating assumptions that underpin NATO have really expired. And in that sense it is fully understandable why the United States would gun for strategic stability. And NATO more broadly, when the interests of the entirety of the largest degree of population of NATO are taken into account, strategic stability is desirable with Russia.
W tej chwili, ta wspólnota zrozumienia, ta wspólna denominacja nie może być dotarła. Ultimately cannot be reached. The Soviets or the Russians might pose an existential threat to Poland, but they will not be an existential threat to anybody west of the river Oder, or perhaps even to the west of the river Vistula, which divides Poland into two. But that means any war with Russia would naturally be a limited affair with limited objectives and limited wars must be solved by political means rather than an existential war that it is for Poland. And that in turn means that Poland could try and hedge to secure actions by the US that would improve its security situation.
But I don't think it will get them. I think ultimately Poland will have to contend with the reality that middle powers threatened by greater powers always face that they have a closed menu of options. And this is not basing their security and survival on the assumption that collective security treaties will work and rather either base it on a regional alliances among states that share the threat perspective Emanating from the same country, so in our case it would be places like Nordic countries, Sweden, Finland. The Baltic states, if we're willing to engage in war with Russia for the Baltics, are very hardly defensible. Places like Ukraine, Romania, perhaps Turkey, but one has to remember that such alliance, like any alliances, would have to operate under the most common denominator.
That alliance cannot, for example, hope to roll back Russia. So that's option number one. Option number two is to declare neutrality, which is something that Russia demands of Ukraine, but also demands much more. Clearly now the points that Wawrow raised in December 21, just before Russia attacked Ukraine, are back at play and they are supposed to be discussed in Abu Dhabi and the Trump administration seems to be fairly optimistic about that. Problem neutralności, oczywiście, jest to, że ktoś może boić się, że to nie będzie działać, że Declaration of Neutrality will not suffice to dispel all the concerns that the other party might have.
To, to, to dishing out punishment to the other state was defeating its armed forces. Well nuclear weapons made it redundant, made it possible to deliver a great amount of pain and terror for political reasons to your, to your enemy without the precondition of defeating their armed forces. And I think Poland ultimately cannot really base The state strategy and survival strategy on the assumption that a concept like NATO will suffice to defend it and it will have to choose from this closed a la carte menu of four options. So it will either have to find regional alliances, declare neutrality and hope that's enough, decide how and under what conditions it's willing to accommodate Russia or nuclearize.
Pokazano wszystkie 17 dopasowań. Transkrypcja generowana automatycznie i niesprawdzana ręcznie — może zawierać błędy.
Autor przedstawia temat rozmowy i powoduje, dlaczego jest ona ważna dla Polski.
Autor analizuje polecamia w artykułie, które sugerują rozwój i stacjonowanie długodystansowych rakiet, aby zagrozić Moskwie.
Autor omawia koncepcję strategicznej stabilności i jej znaczenie dla relacji między NATO, USA i Rosją.
Autor krytycznie analizuje propozycję rozwijania długodystansowych rakiet i podkreśla jej nieefektywność.
Autor omawia teorie strategicznej stabilności i ich relację z polityką międzynarodową.
Autor podaje przykład relacji między USA a Chinami, aby ilustrować koncepcję strategicznej stabilności.
Autor omawia różne opcje strategii Polski wobec Rosji, w tym regionalne aliancje, neutralność i nuclearizację.
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Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future