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Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future

09.11.2026 ·40 min 24 s · 7 rozdziałów

Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future

0:17 · Wprowadzenie i temat 1

Cześć wszystkim, witam w kolejnym podcastie Strategy Future. Dziś mamy coś niesamowitego, ponieważ Jacek, mój zwyczajny kołożnik i fundator Strategy Future, nie mógł to zrobić. Czekałem na niego, a potem on mi powiedział, że jest na drodze do spotkania, więc tutaj jestem sam, próbując coś zrobić. Myślałem, że może dobrym zdaniem byłoby, żeby porozmawiać trochę o tym problemie, bardzo blisko mojego serca w ogóle, And very pressing in particular when it comes to recent events, namely strategic stability in the context of Russia, NATO and Russia-US relations.

2:43 · Polecamia i analiza artykułu w Wall Street Journal 5

And strategic stability and measures how to improve it, how to manage the relationship with Russia are also front and center of the, or will be front and center in the upcoming meeting, I suppose, between Russia, again Ukraine, and the United States and Abu Dhabi. And that topic is interesting. And very close to my heart, because it directly impacts Poland, of course. So there are quite a few ideas being floated around as to how to achieve said strategic stability in the triangle between NATO and NATO states, including those on the eastern flank. And the United States and Russia.

And a couple days ago, I'm recording this on Monday, November 9th, 2026. Couple of days ago, Wall Street Journal ran an article in which a recommendation was made that NATO should consider developing and stationing long-range missiles capable of hitting Moscow as an element of future force posture. I artykuł w Wall Street Journalie w zasadzie opisuje konkluzje, czy rzeczy, które powinny być zainteresowane w dalszym poszukiwaniu z sympozjumem prowadzonego przez oficerów NATO.

Regarding future conflict with Russia. And one of the recommendations was again to develop long-range fires capability by NATO that would be capable of hitting Russia. And the article tries to describe it as denial, as trying to hit the archer rather than the arrow. But to be perfectly honest, I'm a little skeptical if that framing is correct. I think US campaign in Iran has proven conclusively that hitting the archer might be very, very difficult. Hitting both the archer and the arrow really at this point in time is extremely difficult because if you're trying to hit the arrow, you're expanding.

Strategic stability or what remains thereof between Russia and the United States and NATO more broadly. And you know, among a myriad of reasons why it would be the case, because I'm not, even though I'm Polish and we're not really very predisposed to those kind of arguments, I of course recognize the merit in them. The chief reason among many is that it would again very much underscore Russian fears of I guess what could be called conventional splendid first strike, namely the ability to target Russian communication, command and control nodes, At a scale with conventional weapons, thus rendering Russia unable to deliver a first strike or to employ nuclear weapons, which I believe has been a very long-running concern among the Russian strategic analysis community, so to speak.

This has been raised by the Russians for great many years, I suppose theoretically for good reasons, looking at how The US has been able to hit command and control nodes during, for example, the first war in the Gulf, the first Gulf War. So those aren't fully unjustified, although I suppose the degree to which Russians have achieved redundancy and also the sheer number and scale of different weapons platforms, delivery vehicles that Russians have for their nuclear weapons Both strategic and non-strategic really means that such an attempt by either US or the entire NATO, should they even possess those weapons in sufficient numbers, would be insane and that's just on a technical level rather than political cost-benefit and risk analysis, which also renders this idea very unlikely, which again doesn't mean the Russians could just shrug.

20:28 · Historia i teoria strategicznej stabilności 4

Before that, no amount of pleading or asking or even establishing, if it was even possible, strategic stability measures would produce that outcome. I znowu, to samo jak w Wrocławiu. Kiedy sytuacja na ziemiach zmienia się, to rzeczy jak systemy broni i takie rzeczy zaczynają znaleźć znaczenie. Przedtem tego naprawdę nie było. I to oczywiście powoduje mnie do problemu najbliższego do mojego serca, czyli sytuacji, w której Polska znajduje się jako członkowie NATO. The basic thing I must point out is that while for a very good reason US considers improving strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia a desirable goal, it really isn't desirable for Poland.

Because usually, again, strategic stability can be most easily achieved once certain arguments of the side that is threatening the strategic stability are taken into the account. And certain political facts are recognized and, to put it in simple terms, the US backs down. Na przykład w polskim kontekście jest bardzo jasne, że przystąpienie do ustawy o stworzeniu NATO-Rusia w 1997 roku, w mojej uwierze, jest ulepszeniem strategicznej stabilności. Nie wypożyczając NATO-trubów na permanentnym poziomie do Polski i innych krajów, które połączyły się z NATO w latach 90.

Makes perfect sense from the strategic stability viewpoint. Similarly, it makes perfect sense and is beneficial for strategic stability not to have Poland be a part of the NATO nuclear sharing. This is all true. No doubt about this. For the US and for Russia, this improves strategic stability, it allows for Basically a more stable relationship removes uncertainties, some uncertainties from planning, from the overall relation between the states. But unfortunately this happens, so that improves. The overall security of the United States, but simultaneously at the very same time that strategic stability decreases overall safety of Poland.

For example, the decision not to deploy or not to include Poland As a country involved in nuclear sharing, as a country where nuclear weapons, US nuclear weapons that would be, should general war occur, be employed by NATO, according to NATO nuclear planning group plans. Not to have those weapons in Poland does increase strategic stability, but if the situation would be reversed, one could argue, it isn't certain at all, but one could argue that this would improve Poland's security, namely by raising the costs and introducing an element of precise instability and uncertainty and potential for escalation.

27:52 · Przykład relacji USA i Chin 1

It's nowhere close and there is no realistic scenario when that could happen. But that essentially means that the very raison d'être of NATO is really questionable and the basic operating assumptions that underpin NATO have really expired. And in that sense it is fully understandable why the United States would gun for strategic stability. And NATO more broadly, when the interests of the entirety of the largest degree of population of NATO are taken into account, strategic stability is desirable with Russia.

32:20 · Strategia Polski wobec Rosji 2

Now, the West Germans resolved it by, among many other things, threatening nuclear breakout. This forced the Americans to endure those very uncomfortable destabilizing measures, such as West Berlin, for example, to continue, because the West Germans were hedging, basically. They either demanded more security from the Americans, Or they threaten that they will ensure that their security is taken care of by their own means via nuclear weapons. And that debate was running for, you know, in both 50s and 60s at the end of the day. And forced a lot of inconvenient measures by the Americans just to prevent nuclearization of West Germany, which would effectively cause implosion of NATO.

To, to, to dishing out punishment to the other state was defeating its armed forces. Well nuclear weapons made it redundant, made it possible to deliver a great amount of pain and terror for political reasons to your, to your enemy without the precondition of defeating their armed forces. And I think Poland ultimately cannot really base The state strategy and survival strategy on the assumption that a concept like NATO will suffice to defend it and it will have to choose from this closed a la carte menu of four options. So it will either have to find regional alliances, declare neutrality and hope that's enough, decide how and under what conditions it's willing to accommodate Russia or nuclearize.

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