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Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future

09.11.2026 ·40 min 24 s · 7 rozdziałów

Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future

0:17 · Wprowadzenie i temat 2

Cześć wszystkim, witam w kolejnym podcastie Strategy Future. Dziś mamy coś niesamowitego, ponieważ Jacek, mój zwyczajny kołożnik i fundator Strategy Future, nie mógł to zrobić. Czekałem na niego, a potem on mi powiedział, że jest na drodze do spotkania, więc tutaj jestem sam, próbując coś zrobić. Myślałem, że może dobrym zdaniem byłoby, żeby porozmawiać trochę o tym problemie, bardzo blisko mojego serca w ogóle, And very pressing in particular when it comes to recent events, namely strategic stability in the context of Russia, NATO and Russia-US relations.

W związku z tym, co się dzieje teraz, jest to oczywiście ważne, ponieważ po dwóch dniach od teraz, albo po dniach od teraz naprawdę, na wiosnę i wiosnę, będzie spotkanie Abu Dhabi pomiędzy Rosjami, Amerykanami i Ukraińcami. During which a settlement of the Ukraine conflict will be discussed. So that's of course pressing and there are quite a few ideas being floated around in the public square as to how to come up with a solution to the conflict. And in personal terms it is relevant to me because I've spent quite a lot of time and I wrote a book Related to nuclear weapons, to proliferation strategies, really.

2:43 · Polecamia i analiza artykułu w Wall Street Journal 8

And strategic stability and measures how to improve it, how to manage the relationship with Russia are also front and center of the, or will be front and center in the upcoming meeting, I suppose, between Russia, again Ukraine, and the United States and Abu Dhabi. And that topic is interesting. And very close to my heart, because it directly impacts Poland, of course. So there are quite a few ideas being floated around as to how to achieve said strategic stability in the triangle between NATO and NATO states, including those on the eastern flank. And the United States and Russia.

And a couple days ago, I'm recording this on Monday, November 9th, 2026. Couple of days ago, Wall Street Journal ran an article in which a recommendation was made that NATO should consider developing and stationing long-range missiles capable of hitting Moscow as an element of future force posture. I artykuł w Wall Street Journalie w zasadzie opisuje konkluzje, czy rzeczy, które powinny być zainteresowane w dalszym poszukiwaniu z sympozjumem prowadzonego przez oficerów NATO.

Regarding future conflict with Russia. And one of the recommendations was again to develop long-range fires capability by NATO that would be capable of hitting Russia. And the article tries to describe it as denial, as trying to hit the archer rather than the arrow. But to be perfectly honest, I'm a little skeptical if that framing is correct. I think US campaign in Iran has proven conclusively that hitting the archer might be very, very difficult. Hitting both the archer and the arrow really at this point in time is extremely difficult because if you're trying to hit the arrow, you're expanding.

Very expensive and very tough to replace munitions such as missiles for the Patriot system. I think everybody interested in the topic has at least heard of the US manufacturing base issues with producing those missiles. CSIS report, I believe, covered it extensively. So, shortly speaking, hitting the Archer appears to be both very difficult and economically not viable. And even if it was economically viable, which it isn't, those effectors are often more expensive than the missiles launched. But even if money was no object, then it still wouldn't be feasible simply because there are bottlenecks in missile production.

So this is not the option. Ukraine has proven it again. War in Iran, with Iran, US war against Iran has also proven it. Even Israel, not to mention the US, were unable to fully mop up Iranian missile strikes and drone strikes. So hitting the archer is not the option. Hitting the arrow is not the option. While US can failed campaign to destroy Iran's capability to launch those missiles has also proven largely ineffective. Tak więc, przejście archerów nie jest opcją tutaj. Nie jestem pewien, czy ujęcie użytego przez autorów tego artykułu, że to jest próba odnalezienia, jest naprawdę nieaktywna.

Myślę, że to jest znacznie bardziej podobne do wypowiedzi o zniszczeniu. The ability to respond to Russian strikes against, for example, infrastructure or key transport nodes or power generation facilities or ports and so on and so forth. You know, the necessity to come up with an ability to also impose costs on Russians, to change their calculus and, you know, bring the pain, be able to deliver the pain very quickly to Russia itself, but that's really punishment. So, you know, Irrespective of whether it is deterrence by punishment or by denial, I've also noted that quite a few voices in the strategic community, in the analytical community, were very critical of the idea, saying that those deployments would even further negatively affect

Strategic stability or what remains thereof between Russia and the United States and NATO more broadly. And you know, among a myriad of reasons why it would be the case, because I'm not, even though I'm Polish and we're not really very predisposed to those kind of arguments, I of course recognize the merit in them. The chief reason among many is that it would again very much underscore Russian fears of I guess what could be called conventional splendid first strike, namely the ability to target Russian communication, command and control nodes, At a scale with conventional weapons, thus rendering Russia unable to deliver a first strike or to employ nuclear weapons, which I believe has been a very long-running concern among the Russian strategic analysis community, so to speak.

This has been raised by the Russians for great many years, I suppose theoretically for good reasons, looking at how The US has been able to hit command and control nodes during, for example, the first war in the Gulf, the first Gulf War. So those aren't fully unjustified, although I suppose the degree to which Russians have achieved redundancy and also the sheer number and scale of different weapons platforms, delivery vehicles that Russians have for their nuclear weapons Both strategic and non-strategic really means that such an attempt by either US or the entire NATO, should they even possess those weapons in sufficient numbers, would be insane and that's just on a technical level rather than political cost-benefit and risk analysis, which also renders this idea very unlikely, which again doesn't mean the Russians could just shrug.

8:56 · Strategiczna stabilność i jej znaczenie 2

Those things are all very nice, fine and dandy, but I argue, you know, sort of, I didn't really come up with this on my own. This has been an argument raised by, for example, Colin Gray, but also more recently by people like Francis Gavin, which I have mentioned in his I w jego książce, ciągle zapominam o nazwie, ale nazwa jego książki, znowu fantastyczna, była Nuclear Statecraft. To książka, którą czytałem mnóstwo razy, kiedy pisałem swoją. I tam Gavin argumentuje, tak jak Gray, że strategiczna stabilność nie jest czymś, co budujesz,

From piecemeal or granular perspective of confidence building measures or ping pong matches or arms limitation treaties or anything like this. All those things, the fact that those could even be achieved that representatives of two states that have opposing interests could meet And discuss those things, those measures in good will, let alone implement them, let alone put them in writing in a treaty, is really always downstream of political issues. Gavin makes a great point when he describes different theories of nuclear deterrence that were being developed in the early nuclear age, in the 50s and 60s.

13:50 · Krytyka propozycji rozwijania długodystansowych rakiet 7

Ale potem Gavin stwierdzi, czy zapyta, czy to akurat refleksuje sposób, w jaki działa świat. It is interesting to reflect on how rarely the ups and downs of the superpower geopolitical competition mirrored the movements of the arms race. The Soviets pushed the United States aggressively on the issue of West Germany's military status by threatening West Berlin viability at a time when the USSR was not only weak but potentially open to a US first strike in the late 50s. The Soviets left the West Berlin alone in 1962, even as the US nuclear superiority that arguably helped protect the city disappeared.

Why? Because the core geopolitical questions surrounding West Germany's military and political status were resolved largely to the Soviet Union's satisfaction. And that is absolutely key, because this basically means that it's a bit like, again, arms limitation treaties, again to quote Colin Gray and also a French nuclear strategy analyst, commentator Bruno Tertre, whose writings I've also studied very carefully for my book. Arms treaties are impossible when needed And irrelevant when possible. Namely, the right way to achieve strategic stability is not to try and engage in a very futile exercise regarding, you know, tens of thousands of meetings between officers and or trying to establish arms limitations.

If the fundamental, to borrow from the Marxist term, or from Marxist philosophy, fundamental contradictions are not resolved. So the status of West Berlin was such an issue. In general more broadly the status of West Germany and militarization of West Germany, potential for nuclearization of the FRG. Those were the fundamental issues. And whether or not a certain weapon system was stationed in West Germany or number of troops. That really was secondary. Once the underlying issue, the underlying contradiction was resolved, then everything else followed downstream from this, including arms limitation treaties, military to military, transparency measures, everything else.

And I think this is very true. I don't think, also basically because without being able to address the fundamental issues, There won't be enough trust between parties to really engage in those things. Or even if attempts are made, they will either peter out or they will be mere feints from either side trying to Gain an upper hand from the other party. And I think a great example of this, a very recent great example of this, budding one, it's perhaps too early to call it that, but I think so, is the status of relationship between the US and China.

Those of you listeners who have followed the trajectory of the Sino-American relationship under Biden will note that one of the core talking points or core demands or requests that the American side made to the Chinese was to increase military to military contacts, different working groups between members of the military establishment of both countries. And China has been very consistent in refusal They are still very consistent in refusal to engage in arms limitations or like a new start replacement that the Americans want to include China, not just Russia.

But it couldn't be achieved. There wasn't really much platform, much opportunity for the two sides to communicate in good will. And this is at least partly due to how the Americans managed the relationship with China and with Taiwan. Which was, by the way, under Biden administration, unfortunately for those of us, Poles included, who want to see US primacy continue, was catastrophic. And this isn't just me giving this assessment. I remember Jake Sullivan, Jake Sullivan. Myślę, że to było kiedyś w zeszłym roku, kiedy zaprezentował podkast, albo jakąś nową platformę, nową ideę dla niego, żeby zrobić coś, po tym, co zrobił w rządzie USA.

She was a democrat. And even if that's true, then Biden's Repeat statements, which again were usually walked back by the White House, that the US would defend Taiwan actively, really served to drive home the point for the Chinese That the US might be thinking actively engaging in potential Taiwan contingency directly. So the underlying, I suppose the underlying fundamental issue was the status of Taiwan. Everything, even looking at how the Chinese are willing to cooperate with the US. Today one can see that once Trump maybe did not change the overall strategic ambiguity position of the US, but kind of brought up the other side of the equation while Biden administration underscored that the US would be likely willing to get involved in the war.

20:28 · Historia i teoria strategicznej stabilności 6

Trump is underscoring that it's likely that the US will not be willing to get involved in Taiwan. I to było tylko wtedy, tylko kiedy, może nie był to substancjalnie stworzony zmiany relacji Amerykańskiej z Tajemnikiem, ale raczej to zmniejszenie polityki, deklaracyjnej polityki Stanów Zjednoczonych. That the possibility for more amicable relationship with China was created. And now, as far as I can tell, at least according to the media, there are more constructive military-to-military confidence-building measures being employed. And it was only after, only after a underlying political issue was, if not addressed, then at least redressed to look better, that it became possible.

Because usually, again, strategic stability can be most easily achieved once certain arguments of the side that is threatening the strategic stability are taken into the account. And certain political facts are recognized and, to put it in simple terms, the US backs down. Na przykład w polskim kontekście jest bardzo jasne, że przystąpienie do ustawy o stworzeniu NATO-Rusia w 1997 roku, w mojej uwierze, jest ulepszeniem strategicznej stabilności. Nie wypożyczając NATO-trubów na permanentnym poziomie do Polski i innych krajów, które połączyły się z NATO w latach 90.

For example, the decision not to deploy or not to include Poland As a country involved in nuclear sharing, as a country where nuclear weapons, US nuclear weapons that would be, should general war occur, be employed by NATO, according to NATO nuclear planning group plans. Not to have those weapons in Poland does increase strategic stability, but if the situation would be reversed, one could argue, it isn't certain at all, but one could argue that this would improve Poland's security, namely by raising the costs and introducing an element of precise instability and uncertainty and potential for escalation.

Should Russians decide to engage in warfare against Poland, they might consider those places of storage of nuclear weapons as a viable or necessary target to strike and that could yield Unpredictable escalation patterns. By not placing those weapons, US security increases, but at the same time ours decreases and vice versa. If we're able to have those weapons on our territory, our security would increase, but at the same time at the cost of decreasing US safety, by decreasing the margin of error that the US has ability to decide whether they are willing and able to engage And it's very much the same with permanent stationing of forces.

This is, again, a similar situation to West Berlin, where Berlin Brigade, staffed by US soldiers, with families, with children, kids, living in West Berlin, were the integral element of the US deterrence. Not because the Berlin Brigade could defeat or hold West Berlin, Obviously ten to fifteen thousand soldiers facing hundreds of thousands of DDR troops and Soviet troops and the entire might of the Warsaw Pact. So the role of those soldiers was not to fight and win, but the role of the soldiers was obviously to die, this is fairly obvious, alongside their families.

Raising the stakes for the United States And also doing what Thomas Schelling called burning the bridges. The way Schelling put it is by placing soldiers in places where then the onus of action is not really on the US and decision to get involved in war, but rather on the side who would initiate the hostilities, the Soviet Union, the US, and placing them in the way of the Soviet advance in places where on the very first day of the conflict they would be exposed. So that was by definition.

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