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Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future

09.11.2026 ·40 min 24 s · 7 rozdziałów

Why Poland doesn’t want strategic stability? | Albert Świdziński | Strategy&Future

0:17 · Wprowadzenie i temat 2

Cześć wszystkim, witam w kolejnym podcastie Strategy Future. Dziś mamy coś niesamowitego, ponieważ Jacek, mój zwyczajny kołożnik i fundator Strategy Future, nie mógł to zrobić. Czekałem na niego, a potem on mi powiedział, że jest na drodze do spotkania, więc tutaj jestem sam, próbując coś zrobić. Myślałem, że może dobrym zdaniem byłoby, żeby porozmawiać trochę o tym problemie, bardzo blisko mojego serca w ogóle, And very pressing in particular when it comes to recent events, namely strategic stability in the context of Russia, NATO and Russia-US relations.

I mostly based my book on other than the classics like Schelling or Kahn and then, you know, George Bundy. I other classics like this. I also used extensively a book by Vipin Narang. Two books by Vipin Narang. One related to strategies of proliferation and the other to nuclear strategies of middle powers. And finally a book and writings on which I relied greatly when writing those books and trying to understand the topic was a book by Francis Gavin. Who is the editor of the Texas National Security Review. And he wrote a great deal on the topic of strategic stability.

2:43 · Polecamia i analiza artykułu w Wall Street Journal 6

And strategic stability and measures how to improve it, how to manage the relationship with Russia are also front and center of the, or will be front and center in the upcoming meeting, I suppose, between Russia, again Ukraine, and the United States and Abu Dhabi. And that topic is interesting. And very close to my heart, because it directly impacts Poland, of course. So there are quite a few ideas being floated around as to how to achieve said strategic stability in the triangle between NATO and NATO states, including those on the eastern flank. And the United States and Russia.

And a couple days ago, I'm recording this on Monday, November 9th, 2026. Couple of days ago, Wall Street Journal ran an article in which a recommendation was made that NATO should consider developing and stationing long-range missiles capable of hitting Moscow as an element of future force posture. I artykuł w Wall Street Journalie w zasadzie opisuje konkluzje, czy rzeczy, które powinny być zainteresowane w dalszym poszukiwaniu z sympozjumem prowadzonego przez oficerów NATO.

Regarding future conflict with Russia. And one of the recommendations was again to develop long-range fires capability by NATO that would be capable of hitting Russia. And the article tries to describe it as denial, as trying to hit the archer rather than the arrow. But to be perfectly honest, I'm a little skeptical if that framing is correct. I think US campaign in Iran has proven conclusively that hitting the archer might be very, very difficult. Hitting both the archer and the arrow really at this point in time is extremely difficult because if you're trying to hit the arrow, you're expanding.

Myślę, że to jest znacznie bardziej podobne do wypowiedzi o zniszczeniu. The ability to respond to Russian strikes against, for example, infrastructure or key transport nodes or power generation facilities or ports and so on and so forth. You know, the necessity to come up with an ability to also impose costs on Russians, to change their calculus and, you know, bring the pain, be able to deliver the pain very quickly to Russia itself, but that's really punishment. So, you know, Irrespective of whether it is deterrence by punishment or by denial, I've also noted that quite a few voices in the strategic community, in the analytical community, were very critical of the idea, saying that those deployments would even further negatively affect

Strategic stability or what remains thereof between Russia and the United States and NATO more broadly. And you know, among a myriad of reasons why it would be the case, because I'm not, even though I'm Polish and we're not really very predisposed to those kind of arguments, I of course recognize the merit in them. The chief reason among many is that it would again very much underscore Russian fears of I guess what could be called conventional splendid first strike, namely the ability to target Russian communication, command and control nodes, At a scale with conventional weapons, thus rendering Russia unable to deliver a first strike or to employ nuclear weapons, which I believe has been a very long-running concern among the Russian strategic analysis community, so to speak.

This has been raised by the Russians for great many years, I suppose theoretically for good reasons, looking at how The US has been able to hit command and control nodes during, for example, the first war in the Gulf, the first Gulf War. So those aren't fully unjustified, although I suppose the degree to which Russians have achieved redundancy and also the sheer number and scale of different weapons platforms, delivery vehicles that Russians have for their nuclear weapons Both strategic and non-strategic really means that such an attempt by either US or the entire NATO, should they even possess those weapons in sufficient numbers, would be insane and that's just on a technical level rather than political cost-benefit and risk analysis, which also renders this idea very unlikely, which again doesn't mean the Russians could just shrug.

8:56 · Strategiczna stabilność i jej znaczenie 2

Disregard this as a possibility and not be concerned about this. But what I'm really trying to get at here is the very concept of strategic stability and whether deciding to employ or develop or station any given weapon system is really the right way to Try and achieve a state of strategic stability or to improve the overall strategic stability between competitors. And long story short, I don't think it is. The usual measures that are considered to be those improving strategic stability, arms limitation treaties, measures to improve transparency, such as the ones that have been a part of the, for example, INF Treaty or the New START Treaty, or trying to develop proper military-to-military contacts.

The weapons themselves, their letality, their number, their deployments, drove the politics not the other way around. The interaction could produce outcomes separate from the political sources of the rivalry. These theories imply that the most effective policy might not be focusing on the underlying political dispute between rivals, but to control their weapons and their interactions. Więc to stało się trochę nieortodoksycznym, jeśli tak sobie powiem, w wschodnim myśleniu o strategii, o związaniem z konfliktami i o strategicznej stabilności.

13:50 · Krytyka propozycji rozwijania długodystansowych rakiet 2

Why? Because the core geopolitical questions surrounding West Germany's military and political status were resolved largely to the Soviet Union's satisfaction. And that is absolutely key, because this basically means that it's a bit like, again, arms limitation treaties, again to quote Colin Gray and also a French nuclear strategy analyst, commentator Bruno Tertre, whose writings I've also studied very carefully for my book. Arms treaties are impossible when needed And irrelevant when possible. Namely, the right way to achieve strategic stability is not to try and engage in a very futile exercise regarding, you know, tens of thousands of meetings between officers and or trying to establish arms limitations.

She was a democrat. And even if that's true, then Biden's Repeat statements, which again were usually walked back by the White House, that the US would defend Taiwan actively, really served to drive home the point for the Chinese That the US might be thinking actively engaging in potential Taiwan contingency directly. So the underlying, I suppose the underlying fundamental issue was the status of Taiwan. Everything, even looking at how the Chinese are willing to cooperate with the US. Today one can see that once Trump maybe did not change the overall strategic ambiguity position of the US, but kind of brought up the other side of the equation while Biden administration underscored that the US would be likely willing to get involved in the war.

20:28 · Historia i teoria strategicznej stabilności 4

Before that, no amount of pleading or asking or even establishing, if it was even possible, strategic stability measures would produce that outcome. I znowu, to samo jak w Wrocławiu. Kiedy sytuacja na ziemiach zmienia się, to rzeczy jak systemy broni i takie rzeczy zaczynają znaleźć znaczenie. Przedtem tego naprawdę nie było. I to oczywiście powoduje mnie do problemu najbliższego do mojego serca, czyli sytuacji, w której Polska znajduje się jako członkowie NATO. The basic thing I must point out is that while for a very good reason US considers improving strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia a desirable goal, it really isn't desirable for Poland.

Because usually, again, strategic stability can be most easily achieved once certain arguments of the side that is threatening the strategic stability are taken into the account. And certain political facts are recognized and, to put it in simple terms, the US backs down. Na przykład w polskim kontekście jest bardzo jasne, że przystąpienie do ustawy o stworzeniu NATO-Rusia w 1997 roku, w mojej uwierze, jest ulepszeniem strategicznej stabilności. Nie wypożyczając NATO-trubów na permanentnym poziomie do Polski i innych krajów, które połączyły się z NATO w latach 90.

Makes perfect sense from the strategic stability viewpoint. Similarly, it makes perfect sense and is beneficial for strategic stability not to have Poland be a part of the NATO nuclear sharing. This is all true. No doubt about this. For the US and for Russia, this improves strategic stability, it allows for Basically a more stable relationship removes uncertainties, some uncertainties from planning, from the overall relation between the states. But unfortunately this happens, so that improves. The overall security of the United States, but simultaneously at the very same time that strategic stability decreases overall safety of Poland.

For example, the decision not to deploy or not to include Poland As a country involved in nuclear sharing, as a country where nuclear weapons, US nuclear weapons that would be, should general war occur, be employed by NATO, according to NATO nuclear planning group plans. Not to have those weapons in Poland does increase strategic stability, but if the situation would be reversed, one could argue, it isn't certain at all, but one could argue that this would improve Poland's security, namely by raising the costs and introducing an element of precise instability and uncertainty and potential for escalation.

27:52 · Przykład relacji USA i Chin 1

It's nowhere close and there is no realistic scenario when that could happen. But that essentially means that the very raison d'être of NATO is really questionable and the basic operating assumptions that underpin NATO have really expired. And in that sense it is fully understandable why the United States would gun for strategic stability. And NATO more broadly, when the interests of the entirety of the largest degree of population of NATO are taken into account, strategic stability is desirable with Russia.

32:20 · Strategia Polski wobec Rosji 5

Even if that means weakening deterrence. And I don't think that circle can be squared, that you can improve strategic stability overall for Poland, for example, and not negatively affect strategic stability. But that effectively means that that situation might not be resolved because the political things necessary to achieve strategic stability are the things that Poland considers as anathema to its strategic objectives and interests. And that circle also cannot be squared. And under those circumstances, I think once Polish elites realize this, and I'm not sure if they do right now, but sooner or later, either the current elites will or the ones that replace them will, The situation cannot continue.

West Germany was just like Japan, or, well, West Germany just like China, really, more than Japan. was one of the two states that the world completely knew that cannot have nuclear weapons. West Germany, because everybody remembered that the predecessor to West Germany had a very different set of strategic objectives in mind, while China seemed to be the proto-rogue state, which cannot effectively be deterred. I just have to mention Mao's views of nuclear weapons. They were irrelevant, essentially. Ale to działało w tamtych czasach. Wydaje mi się, że to mogło działać z wielu powodów, ale myślę, że to ma sens, żeby stwierdzić, że to działało, ponieważ zagrożenie sowieckie, regionalna hegemonia, zrównoważyła koszty dla wszystkich partii, które były zaangażowane w próbę ubezpieczenia ekspansji sowieckiej.

To, to, to dishing out punishment to the other state was defeating its armed forces. Well nuclear weapons made it redundant, made it possible to deliver a great amount of pain and terror for political reasons to your, to your enemy without the precondition of defeating their armed forces. And I think Poland ultimately cannot really base The state strategy and survival strategy on the assumption that a concept like NATO will suffice to defend it and it will have to choose from this closed a la carte menu of four options. So it will either have to find regional alliances, declare neutrality and hope that's enough, decide how and under what conditions it's willing to accommodate Russia or nuclearize.

I think this is a question that is yet to be answered, but I think the most important thing for the Polish elites is maybe not choose the most ambitious Solution to this problem, which is obviously nuclearization and enhancing it with regional alliances, but rather picking any one of those, assessing what cannot be done in Poland's situation, demographic, economic, industrial and so on and so forth. And pursue state strategy based on clear-eyed understanding of Poland's strategic situation. What's the most dangerous thing for Polish elites to do is to clutch and hold on to the status quo, which is no longer existent.

Thank you and I hope next week we'll meet again with Jacek, not just me soloing the entire episode. Take care. And I wouldn't mind if you subscribe to Strategy and Future as well, it would really help us a lot. Take care.

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