The VoiCEE podcast: decoding Russia's information war in Central and Eastern Europe

Hello, my name is Anastasia Herasymchuk. I'm Deputy Editor-in-Chief at Ukraine World. Today I have a pleasure to talk to Jakub Kalenski, the Deputy Director for the Hybrid Influence Team at the European Centre for Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. Jakub, thank you for joining. Thank you very much for having me. Dziękuję. We are going to discuss Russia's most powerful weapon, its propaganda, with a special focus on how it is utilized in the states of Eastern and Central Europe. Jakub, the elections to the European Parliament garnered substantial attention from Moscow's propaganda machine. While Russia played this card within its domestic media sphere, the most concerning aspect is its attempt to influence the results of elections themselves.

What were the key narratives Russia used and have you noticed anything specific with regard to Eastern and Central Europe during these elections? I think you could say that when it comes especially to the election-related campaigns, the Kremlin is not particularly inventive To nie oznacza, że nie jest to efektywne. To zupełnie inny temat, o którym możemy powtórzyć później. Ale kiedy rozmawiamy o procesie wyborów, w tym wyborach czy referendach, to widzimy dokładnie to samo od, powiedzmy, Skotyńskiego referendum niezależności w 2014 roku. Nie wierzycie w wyniki wyborów. Są zniszczone, autority próbują zabrać wasze głosy. This is all the same and it was the same even ten years later during this year's EU elections.

I think what might be slightly changing are some of the topics that would be used for this grand narrative. Do not trust your authorities, do not trust your media. So whereas several years ago you could be using COVID for that, I guess currently maybe the war in Ukraine Maybe better to say Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. That might have been like the topic that would be used for this. So you would see accusations that our decision makers, our political lead is not interested in peace and they are using Ukrainians as a cannon fodder. It's all a grand war of the West against Russia and somehow only those pro-Kremlin actors in Europe are interested in peace and prosperity, so you should support them.

This is just a small modification to this grand narrative related to the elections. So this grand narrative related to the elections, that will be always the same. Do not trust your authorities, do not trust your media and do not trust your, let's say, mainstream politicians. It's only those extremists, be they on the far left or on the far right, be the communists and the bolszewiks or Wszelkie prawa zastrzeżone. I tak naprawdę, te narratywy najpierw i najczęściej skupiają się na rozstrzyganiu europejskich społeczeństw, prowadzących do zniszczenia procesów politycznych w Europie i rozstrzygania tych społeczeństw.

I to jest bardzo niebezpieczne, tak bym powiedziała, zwłaszcza biorąc w uwagę rosyjskie interesy geopolityczne i ich potencjalne ambicje na zwiększenie, zwłaszcza w Stanach Wschodnich i Centralnej Europy. So it's necessary to be extremely vigilant regarding the narratives Russians are trying to spread within Europe. And here I'd like also to mention another event that was targeted by Russian propaganda and even though it is not directly connected to the region we are talking about and it is not directly connected to Europe, Being a big diplomatic event aimed at launching the preparation process to the peace process regarding the Russian aggression against Ukraine, it concerns the European security in general and of course it is also connected to the security of the Central and Eastern Europe.

Jakub, co myślisz o tajemnicy rosyjskiej propagandy i jej efektywności? Może... Just one sentence about how this effectiveness is perceived in Europe before we get into what factors determine the success. I've actually heard after the EU elections quite a few voices, be it NGOs or decision makers, speaking about The lack of disinformation campaigns before the EU elections. We have not seen much or we haven't seen anything spectacular or maybe we have seen something, but it wasn't successful. I believe it was Edmure that even declared a win in the fight against disinformation.

And again, this is I don't think it's actually a rocket science as they say. The old KGB defectors were talking about this very, very openly. If you can't use a drill, then this mechanism of drop of water falling on a stone is the only tool available and you have to work with that. So it's this drop of water falling on a stone that makes a difference. It doesn't make a hole in the stone because it's so strong. It makes a hole in the stone because it's persistent, it keeps falling on the same spot for decades and you have thousands and millions of drops falling down. This is how it works. So no matter how ridiculous we may find some of the narratives about, you know, Ukraine shot down MH17 or Bucha massacre was staged or

Ukraine is full of Nazis, which is probably my favourite one, given the election results in Ukraine. Ukraine has a much smaller problem with far-right than 95% of Europe, and yet this narrative is somehow popular in some European countries. No matter how ridiculous the narrative, if you spend the money, if you find enough voices, be they paid pseudo-media, Names mentioned in the podcast are the following. Names mentioned in the podcast are the following.

Jednak im bardziej w południu idziesz, i może nawet im bardziej w południu idziesz, You are already getting bigger and bigger numbers and in some countries you can get 30-40% of people believing in this disinformation campaign. I think, if I remember correctly, the numbers were probably the worst in Hungary, in Bulgaria, also not very good in Greece or Italy. And here I'm speaking just about the EU. I think the worst in Europe might have been Serbia, where I think it was over 50% of the population, maybe even 60% of the population believing in this Russian lie. And we are not even speaking about audiences in Latin America, in Africa, in Asia, where the problem is probably far, far bigger.

So it's not so much about the sophistication. It's not that the Russians would be so much smarter. It's not that Wielkie dzięki i do zobaczenia w kolejnym odcinku! Właściwie to, co powiedziałeś, stworzyło wyróżnienie w mojej myśli. Wyróżniłeś te ataki na temat tego, co się dzieje na podziemiach. Mam wyobrażenie bombardowania przez napisy i narratywy.

I believe it's a quote by Garry Kasparow, that the point of modern propaganda is not just to persuade you about something, it's also to exhaust your critical thinking. So there is this element of exhaustion. And I mean, don't get me wrong, I don't think the Kremlin or the Russians conducting these operations are stupid. Jest to całkiem interesujące, że na przykład na Tik Tok aktorzy pro-Kremlina zazwyczaj wyraźnie wyróżniają aktorzy nie-pro-Kremlina w wielu krajach, więc jest tu oczywiście coś, czego wciąż nie rozumiem całkowicie. Nie czytałem wystarczająco dużo materiałów na temat tego, ale myślę, że głównym elementem jest tylko liczba. Więc mamy tak wiele aktorów, tak wiele kanałów, tak wiele platform, tak wiele repetycji tej samej wiadomości,

...as many drops falling on the stone and then we will drill a hole in it. It makes me think about this proactive and reactive approach and this classical understanding of power that disseminates propaganda and disinformation as a proactive factor. And those who are trying to fight this malicious information influences are reactive and reactive approach is always slower. It always gathers less reactions and less attention. Do you see any ways how to improve this situation and change this tactics of being reactive to being proactive to counter Russian propaganda?

I think I do, but the trouble is it's still not very popular in Europe. But I think Ukraine actually offers an inspiration. And that is really to be very robust in Closing down the avenues through which the Russian influence flows into the European information space. So being very strict when it comes to Russian outlets, shutting them down immediately. And I don't think we've done a very good job in that. And I think we should be going further and making sure that Western companies are not allowed to buy advertisement on any Russian media outlets. I I'm not really sure we've made this happen yet.

Last time I saw the rankings of the biggest advertisers on Russian state TV was in 2022. So it was covering the last year before the full-scale invasion. And among the biggest 15 advertisers on Russian state TV or Russian media in general, there were like eight Western companies, you know, there was Marth, there was Oriflame, Nestle. Więc to jest naprawdę, tak jak w tym stworzonym słowem przez Władimira Lenina, że kapitalizm będzie nam sprzedawał śrubę, z którą będziemy ich ścierać. My płacimy za antywesternową propagandę i płacimy tysiące milionów i milionów z tego. Zastanawiając się, że to niemożliwe, ale także nie obowiązkując ich dostępu, nie jest to niepotrzebne, aby zaprosić rosyjskich dysinformatorów

Wszelkie prawa zastrzeżone. You should be mixing proteins and vegetables. You should not be mixing proteins and Novichok. This is not what a balanced diet looks like. You will still poison your audience. So there is no reason to invite notorious Russian liars to the media outlets and there is no reason to invite people who are parroting the Russian lies. It might be useful to remind that when Europe decided to shut down Sputnik NRT after the full-scale invasion,

We did only the things that Ukraine had been doing already in 2014 and 2017, shutting down the state-owned channels. We still haven't gotten as far as Ukraine did in 2021, which is shutting down the channels that are spreading exactly the same message, shutting down all the Medvedchuk's channels. So there is still a lot more we could be doing. Not allowing these people, not just to the traditional media, but also on social media platforms. And again, you would hear this argument that it might be somehow violating the freedom of speech. How? The people are still free to spread lies, they just don't receive every single platform for that.

If I don't get invited to a talk show, my freedom of speech is not violated. If a social media platform decides Names mentioned in the podcast are the following. Names mentioned in the podcast are the following. I I have to admit, I'm not so sure about that. And probably, probably again, given the lessons learned in Ukraine.

From what we heard last year, me and Roman Osadczuk from the Atlantic Council, we were doing a research in Kiev, interviewing various practitioners who are fighting Russian disinformation and propaganda and information operations. And they were saying that in the first few days, weeks after the full-scale invasion, They were actually trying to reach out to the Russian audience and via very innovative routes like these Google reviews, etc. So they were trying to show them what is actually happening in Ukraine. And from what we heard from many of them, not all of them, but from many of them was that they gave up on this after a while because they saw it actually does not make the difference. It is not worth the effort. And from how I understand it, it's very difficult

Names mentioned on the VoiCEE podcast. The question is, are we prepared for an investment that would be significantly bigger than Radio Free Europe and probably also way more aggressive and maybe not even a journalistic way of work. I don't really see this level of commitment in the West. That's really interesting and the way Russian propaganda machine is working in its own space is even more intricate let's say and like these have been decades of brainwashing and

So that's maybe a question for researchers to How to find the ways to reach out the minds of people who have been brainwashed for that long and that are deeply encapsulated in their bubbles and unwilling to face the reality. And getting to the contextual side of this topic, what are the key or what are the strategic narratives you have observed in the states of Central and Eastern Europe first and foremost that are the most widespread there and that are the most malicious to your mind?

Być może jest użyteczne podkreślenie tego, że w Centrum for Excellence nie prowadzimy własnego monitorowania, więc bardziej skupiam się na moim poprzednim zespolem, EU vs. Disinfo, czy wielu innych działaniach, takich jak w Ukrainie, czy w Centralnych i Wschodnich Europejskich krajach. Jest to bardziej wiedza zewnętrzna. I guess it won't sound as a surprise to you. It will be about trying to boost the pro-Kremlin political actors. So you will be picking those actors on the far right and then the far left and you will be trying to work with the topics that are helping them. So obviously if the far right is mobilizing against migration, you will be trying

Ale zwłaszcza w przypadku Polski, a może także Czechosłowacji, można wciąż użyć niemieckich sentymentów. Tragedia II wojny światowej była oczywiście bardzo duża i znajdziesz wiele osób, w których myślą, że wciąż jest pewien poziom wątpliwości na temat Niemiec. Więc w niektórych krajach można użyć tych historycznych grzebów, które oczywiście są jeszcze większe, jeśli idziemy trochę na południe i porozmawiamy o Western Balkans. I mean there the historical grievances are even more fresh. So you can be using that. You'll be using the dividing lines in the society, which is again something that you know only too well in Ukraine.

So the capital versus the countryside, the younger people versus the older people, the better educated versus the less educated. I guess It's probably no coincidence that the ex-president of the Czech Republic, Miloš Zeman, who was one of the most devoted pro-Kremlin politicians in Europe, he was building all of his campaigns precisely on these dividing lines and trying to make them worse. Again, if we have a look at, for example, the region of the Balkans, where you would have so many dividing lines, even more than in some of the countries, not just the ones we talked about, but also the religious dividing lines, the ethnic nationalists.

There is a lot more available there. I think that would be about it. Maybe the one actor we can't overlook in this region would be Viktor Orbán. It seems that his information machine is active also in other countries from what some of the journalists or researchers were writing. They were quite active also in Slovakia, where we unfortunately see the development in a similar direction. I guess that's also one actor we should be mentioning, but I think that that should sort of cover it.

You've just told about the topics, like these main narratives that are aimed at splitting societies again, which is the biggest Russian aim. And you also mentioned some time ago about the measures that Ukraine took to counter Russian propaganda, like closing the pro-Kremlin channels and prohibiting Russian information influences on the central level. All these things make me think again about the potency of Russian propaganda machine, because still, even though the measures were taken in Ukraine to curb these malicious information influences, Russian propaganda manages to poison the information space, especially using these