The VoiCEE podcast: decoding Russia's information war in Central and Eastern Europe

Hello, my name is Anastasia Herasymchuk. I'm Deputy Editor-in-Chief at Ukraine World. Today I have a pleasure to talk to Jakub Kalenski, the Deputy Director for the Hybrid Influence Team at the European Centre for Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. Jakub, thank you for joining. Thank you very much for having me. Dziękuję. We are going to discuss Russia's most powerful weapon, its propaganda, with a special focus on how it is utilized in the states of Eastern and Central Europe. Jakub, the elections to the European Parliament garnered substantial attention from Moscow's propaganda machine. While Russia played this card within its domestic media sphere, the most concerning aspect is its attempt to influence the results of elections themselves.

What were the key narratives Russia used and have you noticed anything specific with regard to Eastern and Central Europe during these elections? I think you could say that when it comes especially to the election-related campaigns, the Kremlin is not particularly inventive To nie oznacza, że nie jest to efektywne. To zupełnie inny temat, o którym możemy powtórzyć później. Ale kiedy rozmawiamy o procesie wyborów, w tym wyborach czy referendach, to widzimy dokładnie to samo od, powiedzmy, Skotyńskiego referendum niezależności w 2014 roku. Nie wierzycie w wyniki wyborów. Są zniszczone, autority próbują zabrać wasze głosy. This is all the same and it was the same even ten years later during this year's EU elections.

I think what might be slightly changing are some of the topics that would be used for this grand narrative. Do not trust your authorities, do not trust your media. So whereas several years ago you could be using COVID for that, I guess currently maybe the war in Ukraine Maybe better to say Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. That might have been like the topic that would be used for this. So you would see accusations that our decision makers, our political lead is not interested in peace and they are using Ukrainians as a cannon fodder. It's all a grand war of the West against Russia and somehow only those pro-Kremlin actors in Europe are interested in peace and prosperity, so you should support them.

This is just a small modification to this grand narrative related to the elections. So this grand narrative related to the elections, that will be always the same. Do not trust your authorities, do not trust your media and do not trust your, let's say, mainstream politicians. It's only those extremists, be they on the far left or on the far right, be the communists and the bolszewiks or Wszelkie prawa zastrzeżone. I tak naprawdę, te narratywy najpierw i najczęściej skupiają się na rozstrzyganiu europejskich społeczeństw, prowadzących do zniszczenia procesów politycznych w Europie i rozstrzygania tych społeczeństw.

I to jest bardzo niebezpieczne, tak bym powiedziała, zwłaszcza biorąc w uwagę rosyjskie interesy geopolityczne i ich potencjalne ambicje na zwiększenie, zwłaszcza w Stanach Wschodnich i Centralnej Europy. So it's necessary to be extremely vigilant regarding the narratives Russians are trying to spread within Europe. And here I'd like also to mention another event that was targeted by Russian propaganda and even though it is not directly connected to the region we are talking about and it is not directly connected to Europe, Being a big diplomatic event aimed at launching the preparation process to the peace process regarding the Russian aggression against Ukraine, it concerns the European security in general and of course it is also connected to the security of the Central and Eastern Europe.

And here I'm talking about the Ukraine Peace Summit. Russian propaganda used specific narratives to discredit it, but it also managed to include its strategic narratives to this more specific topic. I Rosjanie oczywiście używali swojego własnego media i mimo to, że w wielu europejskich krajach jest to niemożliwe, używają platformy społecznościowe i kanałów stworzonych przez te wielkie media rosyjskie i marginalne media lokalne w Szwecji. Names mentioned to disseminate their narratives. First, Russia sought to portray the summit as pointless, emphasizing its own absence and China's unwillingness to participate, pushing lines like no one believes in Dylanski's peace formula or emphasizing its inevitable failure.

So it was the Putin's address on the eve of the summit about so-called peace proposals that were rather calls to capitulation of Kiev. So, we see that Russian propaganda is trying to poison every aspect at different levels, starting from regionals and finishing with global ones, to push forward its agenda and split the societies. Jak widzimy tę efektywność, mimo że media rosyjskie zostały przechowywane i wpływy informacyjne rosyjskie maliczne próbowały być zbawione w wielu państwach europejskich, wciąż negatywne efekty są zauważalne.

Jakub, co myślisz o tajemnicy rosyjskiej propagandy i jej efektywności? Może... Just one sentence about how this effectiveness is perceived in Europe before we get into what factors determine the success. I've actually heard after the EU elections quite a few voices, be it NGOs or decision makers, speaking about The lack of disinformation campaigns before the EU elections. We have not seen much or we haven't seen anything spectacular or maybe we have seen something, but it wasn't successful. I believe it was Edmure that even declared a win in the fight against disinformation.

And I have to admit, I'm sort of flabbergasted to see this. So Russia has spent over a decade Building media empires including troll factories and fake NGOs. Paying off politicians and influencers. Pushing the far left and far right and anti-vaccination and anti-climate change agenda. And they are watching already the third European Parliament in a row where exactly these voices are strengthened. Their camp is getting stronger during every election we see. I wciąż ludzie, którzy są obowiązkowani mówią, że nic się nie stało, wszystko jest w porządku.

Ukraine is full of Nazis, which is probably my favourite one, given the election results in Ukraine. Ukraine has a much smaller problem with far-right than 95% of Europe, and yet this narrative is somehow popular in some European countries. No matter how ridiculous the narrative, if you spend the money, if you find enough voices, be they paid pseudo-media, Names mentioned in the podcast are the following. Names mentioned in the podcast are the following.

They will be finding the audience. And unfortunately we see it on some of the opinion posts. We can see it very clearly. The message that the West is to blame for the war in Ukraine, which in my opinion is like probably the most black and white example of Russian disinformation. Because it's very obvious who was amassing dozens of thousands of soldiers on the Ukrainian border. It is very obvious who launched the invasion. It is very obvious whose tanks are on whose territory. I wciąż widzimy, że niektórzy Europie wierzą w tę wiadomość. I porównanie może być całkiem błędne. Oczywiście są kraje, w których możemy być mniej błędni. Więc prawdopodobnie w południu Europy, w polskich krajach, w Polsce, gdzie, jeśli pamiętam dokładnie, w tych krajach mówimy o około 10-15% populacji, które wierzą w tę wiadomość rosyjską.

Jednak im bardziej w południu idziesz, i może nawet im bardziej w południu idziesz, You are already getting bigger and bigger numbers and in some countries you can get 30-40% of people believing in this disinformation campaign. I think, if I remember correctly, the numbers were probably the worst in Hungary, in Bulgaria, also not very good in Greece or Italy. And here I'm speaking just about the EU. I think the worst in Europe might have been Serbia, where I think it was over 50% of the population, maybe even 60% of the population believing in this Russian lie. And we are not even speaking about audiences in Latin America, in Africa, in Asia, where the problem is probably far, far bigger.

I think I do, but the trouble is it's still not very popular in Europe. But I think Ukraine actually offers an inspiration. And that is really to be very robust in Closing down the avenues through which the Russian influence flows into the European information space. So being very strict when it comes to Russian outlets, shutting them down immediately. And I don't think we've done a very good job in that. And I think we should be going further and making sure that Western companies are not allowed to buy advertisement on any Russian media outlets. I I'm not really sure we've made this happen yet.

Wszelkie prawa zastrzeżone. You should be mixing proteins and vegetables. You should not be mixing proteins and Novichok. This is not what a balanced diet looks like. You will still poison your audience. So there is no reason to invite notorious Russian liars to the media outlets and there is no reason to invite people who are parroting the Russian lies. It might be useful to remind that when Europe decided to shut down Sputnik NRT after the full-scale invasion,

Names mentioned on the VoiCEE podcast. The question is, are we prepared for an investment that would be significantly bigger than Radio Free Europe and probably also way more aggressive and maybe not even a journalistic way of work. I don't really see this level of commitment in the West. That's really interesting and the way Russian propaganda machine is working in its own space is even more intricate let's say and like these have been decades of brainwashing and

So that's maybe a question for researchers to How to find the ways to reach out the minds of people who have been brainwashed for that long and that are deeply encapsulated in their bubbles and unwilling to face the reality. And getting to the contextual side of this topic, what are the key or what are the strategic narratives you have observed in the states of Central and Eastern Europe first and foremost that are the most widespread there and that are the most malicious to your mind?

Być może jest użyteczne podkreślenie tego, że w Centrum for Excellence nie prowadzimy własnego monitorowania, więc bardziej skupiam się na moim poprzednim zespolem, EU vs. Disinfo, czy wielu innych działaniach, takich jak w Ukrainie, czy w Centralnych i Wschodnich Europejskich krajach. Jest to bardziej wiedza zewnętrzna. I guess it won't sound as a surprise to you. It will be about trying to boost the pro-Kremlin political actors. So you will be picking those actors on the far right and then the far left and you will be trying to work with the topics that are helping them. So obviously if the far right is mobilizing against migration, you will be trying

So the capital versus the countryside, the younger people versus the older people, the better educated versus the less educated. I guess It's probably no coincidence that the ex-president of the Czech Republic, Miloš Zeman, who was one of the most devoted pro-Kremlin politicians in Europe, he was building all of his campaigns precisely on these dividing lines and trying to make them worse. Again, if we have a look at, for example, the region of the Balkans, where you would have so many dividing lines, even more than in some of the countries, not just the ones we talked about, but also the religious dividing lines, the ethnic nationalists.

Probably less dramatic, but still life-costing consequences in the Western world. There is this famous case of the Pizzagate shooter, the person who believed in this conspiracy, heavily pushed by the pro-Kremlin disinformation machine, that there are pedophiles in one pizza restaurant in DC. And he drove all the way from North Carolina and started firing a rifle, hoping that he will save the kids from this Names mentioned – Anastasia Herasymchuk, Jakub Kalenski, Ukraine World, European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, Ukraine World, European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, Names mentioned – Anastasia Herasymchuk, Jakub Kalenski, Ukraine World, European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats,

Just to make them more afraid of the Muslims. So these would be probably the most dramatic consequences, but I think you could see it even in a bit more long term. How many people died because of the disinformation related to COVID? We don't have the numbers, but it's clear that it's not a zero. It's clearly more than one. It is actually something that even Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, and the EU leaders are usually quite reluctant in their statements, but even she admitted that disinformation can cost lives. So these would be the most tangible results, but I think there are even some more long-term consequences. This long-term undermining of trust of the audience is really something that threatens democracy.

Her conclusion was that if it wasn't for the Russian influence, Donald Trump would never have become president. So that Russians actually decided to 2016 elections. And we don't even have such good documentation in all the various European elections. But some of them were quite close and in some of them we saw the pro-Russian candidate who was boosted by the disinformation campaign. In some of them we saw them won. Have the Russians decided those elections? We don't know, because we didn't even look into it. Which is, by the way, the conclusion that the UK Parliamentary Committee did several years ago, that the government didn't even look into the Russian influence of the Brexit referendum.