Jacek Bartosiak talks to Gen (ret) Ben Hodges (frmr Commander US Army Europe) on strategic landscape in Europe

This conversation is brought to you by Strategy & Future, a subscriber-supported think tank from Warsaw. We focus on geo-strategy, the military balance in Eurasia and the future of the eastern flank of NATO. If you value unfiltered analysis from Central Europe, consider becoming a subscriber or simply hit the subscribe button on this channel. Dzień dobry wszystkim. Nazywam się Jacek Bartosiak. Witam w stratecie i w przyszłym podcastie. Dzisiaj mój goście jest general Retired, Ben Hodges, former Commander of US Army Europe. Cześć Ben, jak się masz? Jacek, dobrze się mam i miło mi mówić z Tobą znowu. Yeah, from time to time we speak, but we haven't spoken for a while and I was wondering how to start our conversation.

War. Nie jesteśmy fizycznie w wojnie z Chiną, a kraje NATO nie są fizycznie w wojnie z Rosją, ale właściwie wszystkie te rzeczy są połączone. Myślę, że im szybciej zrozumiemy, że Rosja jest w wojnie z nami, tym szybciej dostaniemy odpowiednie polityki, Protect our sovereignty, protect our airspace, protect our populations, protect our infrastructure and also to help Ukraine defeat Russia, which would in turn isolate Iran. Iran needs Russian support and Russia also gets support from Iran.

Ale interesy Ameryki są jeszcze interesami Ameryki. Europa jest naszym największym partnerem w tradycji. W naszym interesie jest to, że Europa jest stabilna i bezpieczna, żeby mogła być przemysłowa. Więc dla mnie jest to łatwy następny krok, żeby powiedzieć, że upewnijmy się, że Ukraina zniszczy Rosję So that Russia can no longer disrupt food and energy supplies in Europe or put millions of Ukrainian refugees on the road causing destabilization in other parts of Europe. To me that's an easy thing to understand and therefore While you don't need a huge American presence or contributions, you should make it clear that it's in our interest that Ukraine defeats Russia, which means Russia is out of Ukraine, and that our European allies know that the US will always be there, and the Russians know that the US will always be there.

Jacek Bartosiak, Commander US Army Europe And in the Baltic States about the possible Russian probing strategy of checking the boundaries, salami tactics, whatever you call it, especially in drone warfare or small scale tactics that they will be testing, probing whether NATO is cohesive, especially given the Iran war and the US reluctance and the US approach towards Europeans, Greenland and stuff. My question is, Poza tym, co już powiedziałem, nie myślcie, że niektórzy w celach rozwiązywania decyzji rosyjskich myślą, że w ostatnich 4,5 latach, podczas wojny z Ukrainą, w zależności od tego, co zrobił Iran.

I would say that they already are. I think that Russia is at war with us, even if they're not launching Iskender missiles into Gdańsk or Bremerhaven. Ja myślę, że są w wojnie. Wszystkie te drony, to nie są wydarzenia, w których zniszczają polski czy niemiecki kosmos. These are constant probing, constant pushing the limits, trying to find out where will we finally say that's enough. You know, there's still a big topic here in Germany about the drones that landed in Leipzig and thankfully with explosives and thankfully did not hit the Ukrainian airplane that was loaded with ammunition and thankfully did not detonate.

But can you imagine if that had happened? What a mess that would have been. Ale Rosjanie widzą, że nawet Polska jeszcze nie zrozumiała, jak naprawdę reagować. Tak, o tym mówię. That's what I'm saying, because this is kind of a new warfare. We are in the old school, apparently. Judging from the comments I read in the papers, judging from how we prepare also, we tend to be in the old school of thinking. While the Russians may be thinking that alongside with the Ukrainians, who they are fighting against, they are in the new school thinking of the drone warfare and how to do it, and they may feel better at it. So this is why

I believe that Chciałbym powiedzieć, że tak, oczywiście, wierzyłem w to całe swoje profesjonalne życie, ale teraz, po pierwszym razie w moim życiu, to administracja USA sprawia, że ludzie się zastanawiają, a więc, oczywiście, jest niebezpieczeństwo. Czy Rosja zrobiła przeglądy, robiąc to? Często wierzę, Most nations of Europe would absolutely respond, whether it was with or without a NATO mandate, with or without the US being a part of it. Because I think you know, and I'm talking about from Finland down to the Baltics to Poland, you know what the price is if we don't.

Sure, I'm not concerned about the intermarium countries that you have just mentioned. Finland, Sweden, Baltic States, Poland, Ukraine and even maybe further south. But is it a fair opinion that United States behavior these days is creating this space for the Russians for probing strategy Providing that they can control escalation, that they will Jacek Bartosiak, Hodges.

Jacek Bartosiak. Decisively demonstrating the, you know, that they can prevail. Well, that assumes, that scenario, which is plausible, but it assumes that Europe did not commit to helping Ukraine win, that Ukraine somehow failed and now Russia is, feels, they look across and they see Western European countries that don't have the will Jacek Bartosiak.

But if Russia's oil and gas export industry was, continues to be damaged like it is, then it becomes very difficult Jacek Bartosiak. I don't know this, I'm certainly not an expert on what goes on inside Russia, but I think that this is the right path for Ukraine is to continue to hammer away on that.

And this is where Europe could be very helpful. Even if the United States is not, Europe could be stopping these Shadow Fleet vessels carrying oil and gas out through the Baltic Sea right past eight NATO-EU countries. Jacek Bartosiak, Hodges. I ask you this question because in Ukraine, when I was last time in Kiev, there are two conflicting views. One view is as you have presented, that it's continuing hitting the oil and gas infrastructure, production facilities, transmission systems.

Jacek Bartosiak mówił, że jest ok, że wszystko jest w porządku, że musimy to kontynuować, ale także rozwijać produkcję balistycznych misji. And we need to hit Moscow and Petersburg hard, like 200 pieces per day, per night, so that the society of Petersburg and Moscow really feel that they are losing this war and this Putin regime is a weak regime, so that there are first cranks in it. And that the oil and gas itself will not suffice. It will not be enough to really overcome it. That they need to really, because this is a dictatorship, they need to

Defeat the image of Putin and so on. What do you think about these prospects, including the apparent escalation, ballistic missiles hit? What does it mean? Is it already a bridge too far because the Russians may retaliate maybe vertically by using nukes? What do you think? Because there are such voices in Kyiv. Yeah, but that kind of strategic bombing did not work in the Second World War, with Nazi Germany bombing the hell out of Great Britain, and then of course the US bombed the hell out of Germany, and German aircraft production increased as the war went on. We bombed the hell out of Japan, and until we used a nuclear weapon, that didn't change their calculus.

Jacek Bartosiak mówił, że nie zostanie to stracone na ludziach, kiedy zobaczą te rzeczy na ognie, czy w górnych sklepach. Myślę, że to jest świetne. To są dobrymi celami. Jacek Bartosiak mówił, że nie zostanie to stracone na ludziach, kiedy zobaczą te rzeczy na ognie, czy w górnych sklepach. Names mentioned. My provide money, we provide political support, we provide some logistics, but there is always a shortage of something. So what do you think? What is lacking? What is missing then? What is lacking is a commitment by nations to say that they want Ukraine to win this war. And a commitment to stopping shuttle fleet vessels from going out to the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. That would have enormous impact.

And I realize there's There's issues associated with it. There's challenges. It's not just, you know, you can't just go out there and start sinking those things. But if there's political will, you can do it. Using all the rules of the EU, for example, about safety and environmental issues. You've got a lot of countries that are violating sanctions, a lot of money moving through. The Greeks, NATO country, EU country, yet they are a big part of Russia's oil shipping industry. So these things are, this is what Europeans can be doing. And I think obviously I still don't understand Germany's reluctance to provide tourists, for example.

I mean, it has to do with the coalition government in Germany and keeping the coalition together will be difficult if part of the left drops out because of tourists. But at least UK, you know, they're stepping forward. Those are the kind of things I think that are important. You know, looking in retrospect, it's been more than four years. Would you, four years ago, envision and predict that this would go this way, Ukrainians will be fighting like that, there will be a new industry, there will be drone warfare and they will be hitting Moscow and Petersburg and oil and gas, machineries and infrastructure?

My next question will be about other surprises that we might have in the future in this war. What do you think? Let's do a retrospective take on it. Well, of course, I did not envision that we would be where we are today. I always was confident that Ukraine could do well. I was surprised by how poorly Russia did in the beginning. I have been very disappointed by US administrations, both the Biden administration and now, that we are not fully committed to helping Ukraine defeat Russia.

So there is this contest of will as well as a contest of logistics. And I just hope that the Ukrainian government Of course, as in war, over such a long stretch of time, there have been tensions. Kiev is in a very difficult position given, you know, the economy, people, political situation.

All those accusations and also US administration was not helping. Actually, I think at some points US administration was bent on collapsing Zawadzki. That's exactly what I think. And we saw it here in the Intermarium countries and we were not only shocked, but frightened that US Transakcjonalna polityka, bo w pewnym momencie okazało się, że USA jest zainteresowane porozmawianiem z Rosjami na kosztach interesów Ukraińskich. Absolutnie, to jest 100% prawda. Więc negocjacja z daleka z bólem Ukraińskich walczących na podłodzie. I może też polski interes był negocjowany w Alaskie i w Porażu w ten sam sposób.

We're spending a lot of money. We need to decide how to spend it, how to organize the force, what to be prepared for and so on and so forth. And there are lessons, there are lessons during the last four years. Jacek Bartosiak mówi, że Polska ma możliwość mobilizacji wielkich, konwencjonalnych wojsk, ale także ma możliwość społeczeństwa, które jest rezygnujące, które rozumie, co jest w stanie, ma infrastrukturę, która jest rezygnująca, ponieważ Polska będzie w środku czegoś, jeśli to się wydarzy w Europie. Nie tylko na terytorium europejskim, ale też na terytorium innych. Myślę, że bezpieczność Polski Jacek Bartosiak, Hodges.

Jacek Bartosiak, Hodges. Jacek Bartosiak, Hodges. Jacek Bartosiak, Hodges. My pleasure and my privilege, I always enjoy speaking with you, Jacek.