Jacek Bartosiak & Albert Świdziński of Strategy&Future, a think tank based in Warsaw discuss the recent escalation in the Eastern Europe and NATO Eastern Flank (Video)

Pursuit by both Russia and Ukraine, attacks against Moscow, attacks against Kiev and the recent developments in Poland and elsewhere in the region of NATO Eastern Flank where the leaders were debating and warning the societies about the possibility of drone and missile attacks and involving Poland, for example. These are the words of the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. into this kind of hybrid warfare and that the society must be prepared. Okay, so maybe the floor is yours. Albert, since all agencies are providing information what was told, the details of what's going on, let's not discuss it, let's just jump right away to strategic conclusions and the questions that of course must be posed at this stage.

That is a war that's supposed to change the security architecture in Europe. It's clearly trying to deny Russia a sphere of influence that it wants to claim. It is hardly surprising, especially if you look at Iran and the benefits of horizontal escalation. It's hardly surprising that you're looking at potential entanglement and spillover from the conflict. And I think it more than anything shows that the elites are not really willing to confront the reality, especially when the reality says someone may die, things might burn. Jacek Bartosiński, Świdziński Albert, Strategy Future, Warszawa. Names mentioned in Warsaw discuss the recent escalation in the Eastern Europe and NATO Eastern Flank Video.

Names mentioned in Warsaw discuss the recent escalation in the Eastern Europe and NATO Eastern Flank Video. Nie ma znaczenia. Było to zmienione. To była świetna wypowiedź, ale nie zgadzam się z tym. Zgadza mi się, że ciągle było mówienie, że wojna nadchodzi. To były bardzo błyskawiczne stwierdzenia. I jest prawda, że było to mówienie, że nie ma znaczenia, że jest nadchodzący ogromny niebezpieczeństw. Jacek Bartosiński, Strategy Future, Warszawa.

Nie wiem jak to powiedzieć, ale miałeś ten głęboki skutek z tym, że wszystko jest w porządku. I myślę, że to w końcu sprowadza się do ludzi, którzy nie wiedzą jak uruchomić escalację. To było również tak, pamiętasz, z USA i Ukrainią. Jacek Bartosiński, Świdziński Albert, Strategy Future, Warszawa. Names mentioned in Warsaw discuss the recent escalation in the Eastern Europe and NATO Eastern Flank Video. Names mentioned in Warsaw discuss the recent escalation in the Eastern Europe and NATO Eastern Flank Video. It also stems from this ideological drift of resulting from conviction that the West is better intellectually, morally, materially and so they don't need to have any kind of escalation ladder with someone who is not even entitled to have the ladder.

Ok, ponieważ to było universalne myślenie, że West jest w zarządzaniu rzeczami i wydarzeniami, a USA militarnie może robić, co chce. Nie będzie negocjować z przeciwnikiem nic. I to był, wiesz, nazwa tego dnia. Ale, wiesz, mam inną opinię o mówieniu prime ministera, trochę inną. W sposób taki, że, wiesz, jeśli masz rację, to on zrobił błąd w escalacji. Once he gave this speech and Russia will up the game and increase this hybrid kind of pressure, then any more appeals to the NATO audience, to the allies by Polish Prime Minister or other regional leaders will only decrease the deterrence and will only erode the cohesion.

NATO should be appealed to in that respect because more appeals will diminish its role. Second, whether Poland has really deterrence by punishment capabilities that are independent from the players who don't want to be involved because they will want, they will have an interest in de-escalating person for most United States and other Western allies. And this is what we were lambasting for the last couple of years here at Strategy Future, that Poland should pursue its own indigenous long-range fires, long deep strike capabilities to control escalation ladder or at least to survive on the escalation ladder up to nuclear threshold with Russia, just like Ukrainians do in a way.

Jacek Bartosiński, Świdziński Albert. So in that sense, if you would want to deter Russia from it, first of all as NATO, you would at least expect, if you Jacek Bartosiński, Świdziński Albert

And this made all the NATO states, the US included, share to an extent a risk assessment between them. Because again, regional hegemony in Europe could have threatened continental US. At least theoretically it would have created a very powerful entity in the international arena. And this basically meant the NATO members had a shared risk assessment and stakes of the conflict were similar. And now this really isn't the case. Russia is a limited threat. The decision to enlarge NATO in the 90s, which was criticized by everybody who knew strategy in the US, by Gaddis, by Kennan.

Ale z drugiej strony, z perspektywy polskiej, to, co powiedziałeś, te obowiązki długotrwałe, umożliwiające urządzenie escalacji na własnej stronie, odniosąc dominację escalacyjną Rosji, co, znowu, będzie bardzo ważne w tym konflikcie, to paradoksycznie powoduje, że NATO jest bardziej trudne, ponieważ, jasne, próba Polaków odpowiadać na ataki rosyjskie, I will even add the gravity of this argument by saying that in the current geopolitical situation where the United States under Donald Trump has distanced itself from being on Ukrainian side and on the contrary

Well, again Poland might also, and on the other hand you have a fear of abandonment in Poland. The fear that should we respond too harshly, perhaps should we respond in any way other than expressing deep concern. NATO states would consider this an aggressive behavior and we would be facing abandonment. Szczególnie, że, znowu, patrzysz na związek, który w wielu sposobach nie jest w porządku. I ten związek naprawdę istnieje w niebezpiecznym wypadku przez ostatnie dekady. I nie wydarzył się wielkich testów. Więc to jest klasyka. I w wielu sposobach zgodzę się z tym, co powiedziałeś o Stanach Zjednoczonych.

Now this is gone. Now, as you said, Donald Trump wants to serve as an independent mediator in a conflict between Europe and Russia. So we're looking at a very different situation in this sense. But again, I think going back to elites, which is a bit of my favorite topic, I think for both, you know, NATO Eastern Flank and European leaders in general, it will be very difficult on like a world view level to recognize and contend with this reality. Those are people who were born and raised and only know the end of history. You know what, I dare to disagree with you on this abandonment and entrapment.

The second thing is deterrence by denial will not work. So, you can't simply build a wall where no drones or missiles will go through. And we... And given the collective alliance, collective nature of NATO, if anything goes through and we do not respond reciprocally, Jacek Bartosiński Even if you didn't mind about this, there just aren't enough interceptors.

But the problem with punishment is that within NATO it's very difficult to execute it, even prepare for it, even by staff that will help to execute it because we are being contained by the US dominance technologically and in terms of situation awareness instruments and stuff. And of course the US wants to control this upper hand by providing high-end, as they say, high-end capabilities. And this is a way of controlling us. And of course our own negligence in procuring proper things in the drone missile warfare situation. So there are those three weaknesses. The US posture that might be a liability in this scenario. Complete impossibility of deterrence by denial.

And that goes across the nature of NATO Alliance and the procurement that was done over the last couple of years. Jacek Bartosiński, Świdziński Albert, Strategy Future, Warszawa. Nawet na ziemiach, nawet Rosja próbuje powstrzymać swoją sferę wpływu. Zajmuje się ogromnymi problemami.

Ale może zostawimy to na kolejny podcast. Powiem tylko, że dwie rzeczy są dość oczywiste. Pierwsza jest to, że NATO naprawdę nie udało się zniszczyć Rosjan i jest w stanie kontynuować się w jego niemożności. Well, the Eastern European states are clearly unlikely both for reasons political and in terms of pure capabilities to be able or to be willing to respond to any Russian more direct assault in kind or to deny Russia escalation management dominance. So this is factor number one. NATO is likely to be timid.

Jacek Bartosiński, Świdziński Albert, Strategy Future, Warszawa So those two do point to Russia qualitatively changing its behavior and being more aggressive. Again, there is always this risk of unlikely decision being made by NATO or by NATO countries. The 1914 situation where you actually get escalation where there shouldn't be, where there shouldn't supposed to be one. Again, this is a very different reality than 1914.

I don't think the societies are marching in excitement to think of war. Most are probably deeply unwilling to face conflict. So you do get this. I'm pretty sure what should happen I think is a topic for another podcast or a series of podcasts because again this goes back to the question of whether collective security arrangements especially ones like NATO will answer to our security problems or whether we should be thinking about deterring Russia on our own and whether we're even able to deter Russia on our own without going nuclear. So I'll just say what will happen. And what will happen is if we get escalation by Russia, it will be a nothing burger in terms of response, both by Poland and by NATO.